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ABSTRACT 
 
This research examines risk factors of the fraud triangle, core of all fraud auditing standards, for 
assessing likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Significant variables, including analyst’s 
forecast error, debt ratio, directors’ and supervisors’ stock pledged ratio, percentage of sales 
related party transaction, number of historical restatements, and number of auditor switch, belong 
to pressure/incentive, opportunity and attitude/rationalization. Results indicate fraudulent 
reporting positively correlated to one of the following conditions: more financial pressure of a firm 
or supervisor of a firm, higher percentage of complex transactions of a firm, more questionable 
integrity of a firm’s managers, or more deterioration in relation between a firm and its auditor. A 
simple logistic model based on examples of fraud risk factors of ISA 240 and SAS 99 gauges the 
likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting and can benefit practitioners. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 large increase in the number of financial frauds reported and subsequent business failures have led 
to concerns about legitimacy of corporate financial statements. These concerns have led to new 
auditing standards and regulations targeting the need for investors, regulators and auditors to 
concentrate on preventing and detecting such fraud. In 1988, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) issued a Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 53 entitled The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and 
Report Errors and Irregularities, which holds the auditor responsible for detecting errors and irregularities materially 
impacting financial statements. Yet Moyes and Hasan (1996) argued that negligible attention was given to auditors’ 
qualifications in detecting fraudulent financial reporting. Then SAS 82 entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit was implemented in 1997 to assist auditors in detecting financial statement fraud in practice. SAS 
82 also provided more explicit guidance on how auditors could achieve fraud detecting by looking at high-risk areas 
and categories. SAS 82 was superseded in 2002 by SAS 99 entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit to expand procedures to detect fraud. Ramos (2003) argued that the new standard (SAS 99) aimed to auditors’ 
consideration of fraud incorporated fully into audit processes from the outset. Also in 2002, the International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) issued 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 240 entitled The Auditors’ Responsibility to Consider Fraud in an Audit 
of Financial Statements. Following ISA 240, the Auditing Standards Board of Taiwan issued a Statement on 
Auditing Standards (TSAS) 43
1
 entitled The Auditor’s Responsibility to Consider Fraud in an Audit of Financial 
Statements in 2006. 
 
Illustrative fraud risk factors of these fraud standards (SAS 99, ISA 240, TSAS 43) were based on the fraud 
triangle proposed in 1953 by D. R. Cressey in Other People’s Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of 
                                                 
1 From 2002, ISA 240 was revised for several times. The majority of TSAS 43 was adopted from the ISA 240 implemented on 
Dec. 15, 2004. 
A 
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Embezzlement. Interviewing persons convicted of embezzlement, Cressy categorized conditions in fraudulent 
financial activities into pressure/incentive, opportunity, and attitude/rationalization. Input from forensic and 
academic experts consistently showed that evaluation of information about fraud was enhanced when considered in 
such a context. Recent studies on risk assessment of fraudulent financial reporting have focused mainly on 
examining several potential fraud risk factors or red flags. Although red flag literature affords some insight into the 
likelihood of fraud, a list of related indicators involves a great deal of subjective judgment and nonpublic 
information available only to auditors or insiders of a firm (Persons, 1995). Investors and policymakers cannot 
access the red flag list to identify firms engaging in fraudulent reporting. Owusu-Ansah et al. (2002) criticized red 
flag questionnaires as rather general, subjective and difficult to apply in practice. Eining et al. (1997) found auditors 
using a checklist of risk factors performed no better risk assessment than unaided auditors. They demonstrated that 
auditors aided by a logit model achieved more accurate assessment than either checklist users or unaided auditors. 
The majority of researches in predicting fraud have employed data in the USA; the present study extends the issue to 
Taiwan’s data on three purposed aspects. First, we identify objective proxy variables rating pressure/incentive, 
opportunity, and attitude/rationalization, based on prior study. Second, each part of the fraud triangle is separately 
probed. Thirdly, we concoct and test our model to predict fraudulent financial statements, which can potentially 
benefit not only auditors or insiders but also investors and policymakers. 
 
Samples examined in the present study are obtained from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ), the Securities 
and Futures Investors Protection Center (TSFIPC)
2
, and Newspaper. We use one fraud firm to match five non-fraud 
firms. 97 fraud fs and matched 467 non-fraud firms are used to develop and test a logistic regression model for 
evaluation in the likelihood of fraudulent reporting. Results indicate fraudulent reporting positively correlated to one 
of the following conditions: more financial pressure of a firm or a firm supervisor, higher percentage of complex 
transactions of a firm, more questionable integrity of firm managers, or more deterioration in relation between a firm 
and its auditor. The results also provide a model for applicable proxy variable relating the fraud triangle to yield 
86.5% accuracy classifications. Likewise, security supervisors can apply this model to identify firms for fraud 
investigation or monitoring. Moreover, through this model, investors can avoid fraud risk and be assisted in 
investment decisions. When auditors preliminary assess new client engagement, the model can also be applied to 
evaluation in the likelihood of fraudulent financial statement. The remaining sections of this paper are organized as 
follows. The next section discusses relevant fraud research. A subsequent section develops hypotheses and sample 
selection. Besides, empirical findings are reported and discussed. Finally, we present our conclusions. 
 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
During the past two decades, interests from academic scholars and practitioners in the field of fraudulent 
financial reporting have grown dramatically (Persons, 1995; Beasley, 1996; Bell and Carcello, 2000; Kaminski et al. 
2004). Albrecht and Romney (1986) published the first empirical study offering usefulness of red flags to predict 
fraud. Later, AICPA-issued SAS 53 clarifies auditors’ responsibility for detecting fraud in 1988, and a large body of 
research has focused on risk assessment of fraudulent financial reporting for examining potential fraud risk factors 
or red flags. Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham (1989) formulated a predictive model based on outlining numerous 
risk factors of SAS No. 53. Further researches expanded the model of Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham (1989) to 
list red flags (Bell et al., 1991; Bell and Carcello, 2000; Hansen et al. 1996; Apostolou et al., 2001; Nieschwietz et 
al., 2000; Wilks and Zimbelman, 2004). The majority of these empirical studies were performed by surveys 
targeting external or internal auditors with questionnaires, where fraud risk factors were included in SAS 53 or SAS 
82. While red flag studies offer some intelligence about fraud, a questionnaire is criticized to be lengthy and 
subjective. Bell and Carcello (2000) used a large number of variables (47 factors plus all possible interactions) to 
predict. Albrecht and Romney (1986) cited 87 red flags in survey. Their data on most of these factors were 
unavailable to other researchers or other users, and it is difficult to perform red flags in empirical operation 
(Owusu-Ansah et al., 2002). Lack of management integrity has been cited as a red flag, and it has referred to 
                                                 
2 According to the law for securities and futures investors protection practiced as of Jan. 1, 2002, the Taiwanese Securities and 
Futures Investors Protection Center (TSFIPC) was established. TSFIPC provided assistance about consultation and 
complaint-filing for securities and futures investors. 
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subjective judgment. Cottrell and Albrecht (1994) argued that red flags were neither predictive nor absolute. Pincus 
(1989) considered questionnaires having no definite impact on fraud risk assessment. Asare and Wright (2004) 
found that auditors who used a checklist structured by SAS 82 risk categories made less effective diagnosis of the 
fraud than those without a checklist. 
 
Another group of studies has examined whether financial ratios (analytical procedures) were useful in 
identifying fraud. Calderon and Green (1994) published the first empirical fraud risk research by using publicly 
available information to construct fraud model. A wide range of analytical procedures was extensively applied and 
included both financial and operating data (Calderon and Green 1994; Blocher and Cooper, 1988; Blocher, 1992). 
Persons (1995) only employed financial ratio affecting likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting and indicated 
financial leverage, capital turnover, asset composition and firm size as significant factors in detecting fraud. 
Heiman-Hoffman et al. (1996) documented that attitude risk factors perceived by auditors were more important than 
opportunity or incentive risk factors. Kaminski et al. (2004) demonstrated the limited ability of financial ratios to 
detect fraud. Apostolou et al. (2001) surveyed internal and external auditors via using the fraud risk factors listed in 
SAS 82. They also found that management characteristics were crucial predictor of fraud. Obviously, a predictive 
model considering financial ratio alone is not enough. Hence, the present investigation examines risk factors based 
on the triangle to detect fraudulent reporting. 
 
Though AICPA outlined numerous fraud risk factors in SAS 53 and SAS 82, only SAS 99 categorized 
these factors according to the fraud triangle theory (Heiman-Hoffman et al., 1996; Wilks and Zimbelman, 2004). 
Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) argued the nontheoretical categorizations of risk factor in prior fraud auditing 
standards (SAS 53 and SAS 82) and in audit practice aids, suggesting sometimes impairment rather than 
improvement in auditors’ fraud assessments. Just few studies on financial statement fraud are related to the fraud 
triangle. Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) examined whether separate assessments in management's attitude, 
opportunity, and incentive risks increase auditors' sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues. Through 
questionnaire that listing 40 fraud-risk factors in the SAS 99, they found that when perceptions of management's 
attitude suggest low fraud risk, auditors who decompose fraud-risk assessments were more sensitive to opportunity 
and incentive cues than auditors who assess overall fraud risk. Although studies on the questionnaire method were 
ample in the literature, studies related to fraud triangle (Wilks and Zimbelman, 2004; Skousen and Wright, 2006) 
were limited. Skousen and Wright (2006) developed a fraud-prediction model that included risk factors related only 
to pressures and opportunities. However, attitude-risk factors were more important than opportunity or incentive risk 
factors (Heiman-Hoffman et al., 1996). We intend to construct a logical and simplifying model for fraud-risk 
assessment instead of lengthy and subjective fraud checklists, and provide a useful tool for practitioners. 
 
HYPOTHESES AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
Hypotheses 
 
We may consider whether identified events or conditions provide useful information in identifying the risks 
of material misstatement due to fraud because fraud is usually concealed and difficult to detect. The fraud triangle 
indicates pressure/incentive to perpetrate fraud, opportunity to carry out the fraud, or attitude/rationalization to 
justify fraudulent action. Such events or conditions are referred to “fraud-risk factors.” Although these fraud-risk 
factors do not necessarily imply the existence of fraud, they often are present in circumstance where fraud exists. 
The name of appendices in the three fraud-auditing standards (SAS 99, ISA 240, and TAS 34) is “Examples of 
Fraud-Risk Factors,” which is relevant to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting. Employing the 
examples cited in these auditing standards and referring to the prior literature, we develop several hypotheses and 
identify proxy variables representing various measures of pressure/incentive, opportunity, and 
attitude/rationalization. 
 
1.  Pressure/Incentive 
 
Pressure/incentive results from a perceived pressure on managers or employees to commit fraud. A firm 
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may hold incentives to manipulate earnings, when any of the following three conditions occurs. First, financial 
stability is threatened by economy and industry. Second, management is pressured for meeting expectations of third 
parties. Third, management or directors’ personal financial situation is intimidated by the entity’s financial 
performance. We propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  When a firm sustains more financial pressure, we may identify more risks of material misstatements due to 
fraud. 
 
A firm in a growth stage, it possesses the highest sale growth, the highest capital expenditure, the lowest 
dividend payout, and more requirement of outside capital fund (Black, 1998). Besides, if a firm lapses from growing 
trend, the stock price can be strong fluctuated (Barth et al., 1999). Stice (1991) found client growth to be positively 
associated with litigations and conjectures that high growth might be accompanied with ineffective internal control 
systems and misleading financial statements. Also, Bell and Carcello (2000) found that rapid company growth was a 
significant risk factor in likelihood of fraudulent reporting. To capture extreme growth levels, we follow Krishnan’s 
(2005) measure by a dummy variable, high growth (HIGHGR), which is coded by 1 for growth rate on assets of a 
firm greater than that of industry median, and coded by 0 otherwise. 
 
Degeorge et al. (1999) presented that hierarchy existed among the following three earnings thresholds: (1) 
avoiding negative earnings, (2) reporting increases in quarterly earnings, and (3) meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Kasznik and McNichols (2002) found that abnormal annual returns were significantly large for firms meeting 
analyst’s expectations after controlling for analysts’ expectations of future earnings, and the markets also 
extraordinarily punished firms without meeting the expectations. This situation also imposed pressure on 
management to achieve earnings expectations. Lopez and Rees (2002) demonstrated that earnings multiple applied 
to unexpected earnings (i.e., realized earnings exceeding analysts’ earnings forecasts) is significantly greater than 
that to negative unexpected earnings. Pressure imposed on management to meet analysts’ earnings estimates is an 
important cause of fraudulence. Calderon and Green (1994) found that differences between financial analysts’ 
forecasted earnings and reported earnings were positive correlated to likelihood of fraud. We use analyst’s forecast 
error (AFE) to measure one of the financial pressures on management. AFE equals the value obtained by subtraction 
of company’s realized earnings per share after restatement from the latest analysts’ earnings forecasts of earnings per 
share in event year. The “event year” is defined by the year of financial statements with disclosure of fraudulent data. 
We predict positive relation between forecast error and fraud risk. 
 
Hayn (1995), Lipe et al. (1998), and Collins et al. (1999) showed that the cross-sectional return (or price) 
earnings relation of firms reporting losses was much weaker than that of firms reporting profits. Hayn (1995) 
reported negative coefficients for regression of returns on earnings of firms posting losses over two or more 
consecutive years. We measure consecutive losses by (1) reporting losses over two years (LOSS) and (2) two or 
more successive years of negative cash flow from operation (NCFO). 
 
Dechow et al. (1996) argued that high leverage firms having debt covenants motivated the earnings 
manipulation. We use debt ratio (total debt to total assets; LEV) to measure leverage employed frequently in the 
extant literature as a proxy for closeness to covenants and associated with the existence and tightness of covenants 
(Duke and Hunt, 1990; Press and Weintrop, 1990). Leverage ratios are also likely to be proxy of demand for external 
financing motivation. We predicate that the relation between debt ratio and fraudulent reporting occurrence is 
positive. 
 
H2:  When directors and supervisors sustain more financial pressure connects with firm’s earnings, management 
have more incentive to manipulate financial statements, resulting in fraud. 
 
Since pledging for loans reduces personal fund demands, degree of personal leverage expanded by 
managerial stockholder increases risk of companies. When stock market collapses, managerial stockholders become 
motivated in maintaining stock price (collateral). If corporate governance is weak, corporate funds represent the 
easiest and fastest funding for stock-price support. Unfortunately, when stock markets continue collapsing, 
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companies are trapped in financial difficulties (Lee and Yeh, 2004). We predicate that directors’ and supervisors’ 
stock-pledging rate (PLEDGE) increases fraud probability. 
 
2.  Opportunities 
 
Opportunities result from circumstances that provide chances to commit fraud. Complicated transactions 
are accompanied with high inherent risk because of involvement in high degree of management judgment and 
subjectivity. Also, complicated transactions may present risks of material misstatement due to fraud because of 
susceptible to manipulation by management. We propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H3:  When higher percentage of complicated transactions emerges, a firm encounters greater probability of 
fraud. 
 
This work examines two kinds of transactions. One is the impact of complex financial scheme on fraud. 
Enron executives devised complex financial arrangement to defraud Enron and its shareholders transacted 
off-the-books partnerships to make the company look far more profitable than it was (Bratton, 2002; Swartz and 
Watkins, 2003; Deakin and Konzelmann, 2004). Thus, we use equity investment ratio (INV%) as a proxy of measure 
complex financial scheme. The other is related party transaction. In a case study, Young (2005) found that related 
party transactions were allegedly used to manipulate earnings, loot companies, and commit fraud. Since firms 
mainly operate by revenue recognition as window dressing for operating results (GAO, 2002; Palmrose et al., 2004), 
we select percentage of sales-related party transaction (RPT%) in the present model. 
 
Effective internal control can maintain reliability of firms’ financial statements and prevent fraud. Weak 
internal audit, even when management override controls, may increase the likelihood of material financial 
misstatement. We propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H4:  When a firm under weaker internal control environment, management has more opportunities to defraud 
financial statements. 
 
Jensen (1993) argued for position separation of board chairman from chief executive officer 
(CEO)/president if a board is an effective monitoring device. Because a board chairman conducted board of director 
meetings and oversaw process of hiring and evaluation and compensation for the CEO, we evaluate how a board 
chairman occupying CEO/president position (CEO) impacts fraud occurrence. 
 
La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) found that smaller ratio of cash flow rights to control 
rights represented higher tendency for controlling shareholders to expropriate minority wealth and lower firm 
valuation (La Porta et al., 2002). Lee and Yeh (2004) concluded that deviation in control away from cash flow rights 
was related to risk for financial distress. Poor corporate governance provided opportunities to controlling 
shareholders to transfer value from a firm into personal profit. In turn, reduction in corporate value led to a high 
probability of earnings manipulation. Hence, we study effects of deviation in control away from the cash flow rights 
(DEVR) in fraud risk, following method of La Porta et al. (1999, 2002). Definition of control right includes direct 
and indirect control rights. Direct control relies on voting rights of controlling shareholders, and indirect control is 
voting rights generated from shares held by entities that are in turn controlled by the controlling shareholders, as 
described in La Porta et al. (2002, p.1157): 
 
A shareholder has an x percent indirect control over firm A if: (1) she controls directly firm B which, in turn, 
directly controls x percent of the votes in firm A; or (2) she controls directly firm C which in turn controls firm B (or 
a sequence of firms leading to firm B, each of which has control over the next one, i.e., they form a control chain) 
which, in turn, directly controls x percent of the votes in firm A. A group of n companies form a chain of control if 
each firm 1 through n-1 controls the consecutive firm. A firm in our sample has a controlling shareholder if the sum 
of her direct and indirect voting rights exceeds 10 percent. When two or more shareholders meet our criteria for 
control, we assign control to the shareholder with the largest (direct plus indirect) voting stake. 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – February, 2009 Volume 7, Number 2 
 66 
Cash flow rights owned by controlling shareholders are computed as products of all equity stakes along the 
control chain. Deviation in control away from cash flow rights (DEVR) equals ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash 
flow rights to control rights. We predict that in a firm with lower DEVR, management possibly expropriates minority 
wealth, yielding higher probability of fraud.   
 
Besides, internal auditor is essential in support internal control function. Internal auditor is expected to play 
an effective role in deterrence, detection, and reporting of fraudulent reporting. Beasley et al. (2000) found that 
internal audit existence in fraud companies was less common than that of non-fraud companies. High internal 
auditor turnover reveals that organizational structure of a firm is unstable. Moreover, internal control components 
are deficient as a result of high turnover rates of internal auditor. We measure turnover frequency of internal auditor 
(INAUD), defined by number of internal auditor switch in the past three years (including event year). We predicate 
that high INAUD increases fraud probability. 
 
3.  Attitude/Rationalization 
 
Attitude or character is what leads one or more individuals to rationally commit fraud. Management 
integrity (attitude) is a major determinant of financial statement quality. When manager integrity is queried, 
reliability of financial statement is doubtful. We propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H5:  When more queries about manager’s integrity arise, a firm has greater probability of fraud. 
 
While management attitude is not observable, we use a proxy, historical financial restatement times (RST) 
based on observed data, to capture management integrity. If a firm has higher frequency of financial restatement, 
reliability of financial statement is lower, and managers’ integrity is queried. Historical financial restatement times 
are counted by number of earnings-affected restatement in the quarterly financial statement (including consolidated 
financial statement) during the two preceding years. For example, if the financial statement in 1997 is alleged fraud, 
number of restatement during the period 1995-1996 is measured. In addition, it includes voluntary and mandatory 
restatements. 
 
Independent auditor is an important supervisor on financial reporting. Relationship between manager and 
auditor denotes the rationalization of firm management. Thus H6 is developed: 
 
H6:  When relationship between manager and auditor becomes worse, a firm encounters greater probability of 
fraud. 
 
Sorenson et al. (1983) implied that a client could change auditors to reduce likelihood of detection of a 
financial statement fraud. Loebbecke et al. (1989) proffered that 36 percents of fraud in their sample were alleged in 
the initial two years of an auditor’s tenure. Risk of audit failure and subsequent litigation in initial engagement are 
higher than those in subsequent years (Stice, 1991). Both Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) and Shu (2000) found that 
auditor resignation was positively associated with likelihood of litigation. With number of auditor switch in the 
event year (△CPA) as a proxy for rationalization, we predict that △CPA is positively correlated to the likelihood of 
fraud. 
 
4.  Control Variables 
 
Larger firms usually have stronger internal control systems than smaller firms (O’Reilly et al. 1998). Strong 
correlation between firm size and financial fraud is demonstrated by previous paper (Bonner et al. 1998; Beasley et 
al. 1999). However, firm size is also controlled in our model, since our matching process is not exact. We predict a 
negative relation between firm size (SIZE) and fraudulent financial reporting. 
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Sample Selection And Data 
 
Our samples of financial statement fraud are limited to publicly traded firms because the present study 
focuses information available only in proxies and financial statements filed by the SEC. We glean samples from 
Taiwanese publicly traded firms, including Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and Taiwan over-the-counter market 
(OTC). The majority of the samples are obtained from database named the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). 
Identified fraud samples where a mandatory act address accounting and auditing irregularities was taken by the SEC 
during 1996-2006, are 123 firms. That a firm restates financial reporting exceeding two quarterly statements in one 
year is regarded as one sample. 52 samples belonging to three categories are excluded in the sample selection, as 
elaborated below. First, 37 samples are excluded because financial reporting of same firm were restated for the same 
reason in different years. Second, 12 firms of banks, securities, or insurance industry are removed. Third, three 
samples with incomplete information can not be counted. Other samples including 26 firms suited by investors, 
creditors, or regulators for fraudulent financial statements are obtained from the Securities and Futures Investors 
Protection Center (TSFIPC) and Newspaper. Thus, 97 firms with fraudulent financial statements are included in this 
paper. Table 1 (Panel A) lists the sample selection procedures. 
 
Control firms are matched based on year, assets size, industry, and trade market (TSE or TOC) in the year 
preceding the event year (Beasley, 1996). Zmijewski (1984) argued that using a matched-pairs design derived 
existence of choice-based sample biases from "oversampling". Actual frequency rates of fraud firms in Taiwan are 
less than 20%. We use one fraud firm to match five non-fraud firms, except when amount of company in industry is 
insufficient. Finally, 97 fraud firms matched 467 non-fraud firms in this study. 
 
TABLE 1: Sample Composition 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Mandatory restatements by the TSFB, 1996-2006  123 
Less:   
Restatement by same reason 37  
Companies belong to banks, securities or insurance firms 12  
Companies with incomplete information 3 (52) 
Add: Lawsuit  26 
Total number of fraud firms included in study  97 
 
Panel B: Industry and Market Classification 
Industry (code) 
Fraud Firms Comparison Firms 
TSE OTC Total TSE OTC Total 
n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Cement 1 1.0 0 0.0 1 1.0 5 1.1 0 0.0 5 1.1 
Food 9 9.3 1 1.0 10 10.3 45 9.6 1 0.2 46 9.9 
Plastic 4 4.1 1 1.0 5 5.2 23 4.9 0 0.0 23 4.9 
Textile 9 9.3 0 0.0 9 9.3 45 9.6 0 0.0 45 9.6 
Electric machinery 5 5.2 0 0.0 5 5.2 25 5.4 0 0.0 25 5.4 
Electric wire and cable 3 3.1 0 0.0 3 3.1 15 3.2 0 0.0 15 3.2 
Chemicals 1 1.0 0 0.0 1 1.0 5 1.1 0 0.0 5 1.1 
Steel 7 7.2 0 0.0 7 7.2 30 6.4 0 0.0 30 6.4 
Rubber 2 2.1 0 0.0 2 2.1 10 2.1 0 0.0 10 2.1 
Auto 2 2.1 0 0.0 2 2.1 6 1.3 0 0.0 6 1.3 
Electronics 28 28.9 7 7.2 35 36.1 140 30.0 35 7.5 175 37.5 
Construction 8 8.2 1 1.0 9 9.3 40 8.6 5 1.1 45 9.6 
Transport 2 2.1 0 0.0 2 2.1 10 2.1 0 0.0 10 2.1 
Tourism 1 1.0 0 0.0 1 1.0 5 1.1 0 0.0 5 1.1 
Merchandise 1 1.0 1 1.0 2 2.1 5 1.1 2 0.4 7 1.5 
Others 3 3.1 0 0.0 3 3.1 15 3.2 0 0.0 15 3.2 
Total 86 88.7 11 11.3 97 100 424 90.8 43 9.2 467 100 
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Panel B contains industry and market classification of samples. Most samples belong to electronics industry 
and TSE trade market. We use χ2 to test the impact of different industry and trade market on event occurrence. We 
find that phi value between industry of fraudulent firms and fraudulent financial occurrence is 0.028 (p-value = 1.00). 
The phi value between fraudulent firm’s trading market and event occurrence is -0.027 (p-value = 0.52). Impact of 
different industry and trade market on fraudulent financial occurrence is not statistically significant. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics And Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 2 (Panel A) presents means, medians, and results of Wilcoxon and Median tests. Since data do not 
conform to assumed normal distribution, we use Wilcoxon sign rank test and Median nonparametric test to evaluate 
differences of mean and median between fraud and non-fraud firms in independent variables. Results show 
significant (p < .05) difference in most variables. 
 
 
TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics for Risk Factors from the fraud triangle 
Risk Factors from the fraud triangle 
Fraud 
(N = 97) 
Non-fraud 
(N = 467) 
Z Value 
Wilcoxon Test 
Median Test 
Pressure/Incentive     
H1 
HIGHGR 
Mean 
Median 
0.2800 
0.0000 
0.4300 
0.000 
-2.7740*** 
-2.7744*** 
AFE 
Mean 
Median 
3.9909 
0.9600 
0.6143 
0.3121 
4.4185*** 
3.0244*** 
LOSS 
Mean 
Median 
0.2300 
0.0000 
0.0071 
0.0000 
4.7172*** 
4.7127*** 
NCFO 
Mean 
Median 
0.2500 
0.0000 
0.1100 
0.0000 
3.5677*** 
3.5638*** 
LEV 
Present 
Percent 
0.6841 
0.6019 
0.3973 
0.4042 
9.0375*** 
6.8005*** 
H2 PLEDGE 
Mean 
Median 
0.3860 
0.3005 
0.2052 
0.0977 
4.5284*** 
3.2330*** 
Opportunity     
H3 
INV% 
Mean 
Median 
0.6513 
0.3951 
0.3650 
0.2996 
1.5971* 
2.1182** 
RPT% 
Mean 
Median 
0.1816 
0.0700 
0.1285 
0.0400 
1.7757** 
1.8710** 
H4 
CEO 
Mean 
Median 
0.2900 
0.0000 
0.2400 
0.0000 
0.9650 
0.9655 
DEVR 
Mean 
Median 
0.8300 
0.9800 
0.8100 
0.9300 
1.5327* 
1.8952** 
△INAUD 
Mean 
Median 
0.1600 
0.0000 
0.0685 
0.0000 
2.8672*** 
2.8777*** 
Attitude/Rationalization     
H5 RST 
Mean 
Median 
1.1900 
0.0000 
0.2000 
0.0000 
5.1749*** 
4.7504*** 
H6 △CPA 
Mean 
Median 
0.1900 
0.0000 
0.0150 
0.0000 
7.1152*** 
7.1096*** 
Control Variable     
SIZE 
Mean 
Median 
9.8062 
9.7890 
9.7982 
9.8093 
0.3078 
-0.1115 
*, **, *** Significant at p-value < .10, .05, .01, respectively. 
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FRAUD = 1 for firms subject to financial restatements mandated by TSFB or categorized by TSFIPC as cases of 
fraudulent financial reporting, otherwise 0. 
HIGHGR = dummy variable coded by 1 for growth rate on assets of a firm greater than that of industry median, 
and coded by 0 otherwise. 
AFE  = value obtained by subtraction of company’s realized earnings per share after restatement from the 
latest analysts’ earnings forecasts of earnings per share in event year. 
LOSS = dummy variable with value of 1 if firms report losses in the first and second years before the event 
years; otherwise 0. 
NCFO = dummy variable with value of 1 if firms report negative cash flow from operating activity in the first 
and second years before the event years; otherwise 0. 
LEV  = total liability to total assets after restatement. 
PLEDGE = value of the percentage of shareholdings pledged for loans and credits by directors and supervisors 
report to Taiwan Securities and Futures Commission (TSFC). 
INV%  = total equity investment to total stockholder equity. 
RPT%  = sales about related party transaction scaled by total sales. 
CEO  = dummy variable with a value of 1 if chairperson of board holds managerial position of CEO or 
president; otherwise 0. 
△INAUD = number of internal auditor switch in the past three years (including the event year). 
DEVR  = controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to control rights. 
RST  = number of earnings-affected restatements in two years before fraud occurrence. 
△CPA = number of auditor switch in the fraud year. 
SIZE  = logarithm of a firm’s total assets after financial restatement.  
 
The pressure/incentive variables AFE, LOSS, NCFO, and LEV show positive significance (p < .01) of 
conformity with H1. Probability of fraud rises if a firm contains large analyst’s forecast error, reports losses over two 
successive years, reports negative cash flow from operation over two successive years, or contains high leverage 
ratios. HIGHGR does not conform to prediction sign, although the valuable is significant (p < .01). After rechecking 
original data, we find that non-fraud firms possess high rate of growth and can be free from growth trap. Directors’ 
and supervisors’ pledging stock rate (PLEDGE) is significant at p level of .01, attesting that an increase in PLEDGE 
of a firm raises fraud probability. Among opportunity variables, equity investment ratio (INV%) and percentage of 
sales about related party transaction (RPT%) of fraud firms are significant, supporting H3 that a firm with higher 
ratio of complex transactions accompanies higher probability of fraud. Deviation in cash flow away from the control 
rights (DEVR) is positively related to fraud occurrence (significant at p < .1), indicating opposite expectations. CEO 
is insignificant. The rationale behind this result is that the listed firms are mainly family controlled in Taiwan and a 
firm’s chairman of the board is usually its president. However, CEO is crucial to risk factor in prior research 
(Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 1999, Abbott et al., 2000). Note that, firms in the US are typically run by professional 
managers. Results of △INAUD by Wilcoxon and Median tests support H4, attesting that the internal audit function is 
efficiently enforced by stable internal audit management. When internal auditor frequently switches, it is possible 
that internal control system becomes weak to prevent fraud occurrence. All attitude/rationalization variables for 
fraud and non-fraud firms are significant (p < .01). A firm with higher frequency of financial restatement in two 
years before fraud occurrence causes lower reliability of financial statement, more queries about manager’s integrity, 
supporting H5. The relation between manager and auditor exhibits rationalizations of managerial organization. 
Higher turnover frequency of auditor in the event year (△CPA) indicates higher fraud risk, supporting H6. However, 
SIZE is insignificant under appropriate control on matching samples, indicating fraud and non-fraud firms in the 
samples are of approximate scale in total assets.  
 
Correlation Coefficient Analysis And Modeling 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for dependent and independent variables. As expected, most 
independent variables are significantly related to fraud. All coefficients among other independent variables are 
below .25, except the correlation coefficient between LEV and LOSS and that between LEV and NCFO. Although, 
HIGHGR is significantly related to fraud, its sign is opposite to prediction. After univariable analyses by Wilcoxont, 
Median, and Spearman-rank correlation tests, we follow recommendations of Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) to 
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select explanatory variables having a p-value equal or smaller than 0.15 in univariate analyses. Among the five H1 
variables, LEV is significantly correlated to LOSS and NCFO. To avoid multicollinearity problem, the three 
variables are represented by LEV. The relationship between INV% and RPT% is statistically significant. Since the 
model’s increasable explanation is feeble by INV%, we choose RPT% as a proxy variable for the percentage of 
complex transactions. Finally, we select three pressure/incentive variables, two opportunity variables, and two 
attitude/rationalization variables for the six hypotheses containing thirteen variables. The logistic model is written: 
 
FRAUD = β0 + β1 AFE + β2 LEV + β3 PLEDGE + β4 RPT% + β5 △INAUD + β6 RST  + β7 △CPA + β8 SIZE + ε (1) 
 
where: 
 
FRAUD = 1 for firms subject to financial restatements mandated by TSFB or categorized by TSFIPC as cases 
of fraudulent financial reporting, otherwise 0. 
AFE  = value obtained by subtraction of company’s realized earnings per share after restatement from the 
latest analysts’ earnings forecasts of earnings per share in event year. 
LEV = total liability to total assets after restatement. 
PLEDGE = value of the percentage of shareholdings pledged for loans and credits by directors and supervisors 
report to Taiwan Securities and Futures Commission (TSFC). 
RPT%  = sales about related party transaction scaled by total sales. 
△INAUD = number of internal auditor switch in the past three years (including the event year). 
RST  = number of earnings-affected restatements in two years before fraud occurrence. 
△CPA = number of auditor switch in the fraud year. 
SIZE  = logarithm of a firm’s total assets after financial restatement. 
 
Besides correlation analysis, we check the tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) of independent 
variables. Values of tolerance of all independent variables are greater than 0.75, far exceeding the requirement of 0.2 
(Menard, 1995). Values of VIF of all independent variables are below 10 (Neter et al., 1990), not exceeding 1.5 
(Greene, 1999). No multicollinearity problem exists in the present model. 
 
Multivariate Results 
 
Logistic Regression Model 
 
Next, we test three parts of fraud triangle by logistic regression. Table 4 presents estimations of parameters, 
Wald chi-square, p-value, and goodness-of-fit statistics for the logistic regression model. Three pressure/incentive 
variables, AFE, LEV, and PLEDGE, of Model 1 are significantly correlated to FRAUD. Two opportunity variables, 
RPT% and △INAUD, of Model 2 are significantly correlated to FRAUD. Two attitude/rationalization variables, RST, 
CPA, of Model 3 are significantly correlated to FRAUD. Statistically significant likelihood ratios of the three 
models are 142.0395 (p < .0001), 10.8014 (p < .05), and 72.1030 (p < .0001), respectively. Class percent 
concordances of the three models are 80.8%, 58.7%, and 86.5%, respectively. Model 4 consists of three 
pressure/incentive variables, two opportunity variables, two attitude/rationalization variables, and one control 
variable. Likelihood ratio of Model 4 is highly significant (p < .0001). Class percent concordance and R-square of 
Model 4 are, respectively, 86.5% and 0.2813. Note that R-square is greater than the requirement of 0.2 (McFadden, 
1974). These results display our model’s adequacy. Six variables of Model 4, i.e., AFE, LEV, PLEDGE, RPT%, RST, 
and CPA, are significantly positively correlated to probability of fraud. Multivariable results indicate that a firm 
sustaining financial pressure (AFE and LEV in H1), supervisor/director sustaining financial pressure connected with 
firm’s earnings (PLEDGE in H2), high percentage of complex transactions (RPT% in H3), questionable managerial 
integrity (RST in H5), and deteriorated relation between a firm and its auditor (CPA in H6) are positively correlated 
to fraudulent statements reporting. The results also provide new evidence to support H1, H2, H3, H5, and H6. As far 
as H4 is concerned, it is supported by results of univariable tests and Model 2. As expected, SIZE is significantly 
negatively correlated to financial fraud, as attested in prior papers (Bonner et al. 1998; Beasley et al. 1999). When a 
firm of larger size possesses stronger internal control systems, probability of fraud becomes lower. 
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TABLE 3:  Correlation matrix for dependent and independent variablesa,b 
 FRAUD HIGHGR AFE LOSS NCFO LEV PLEDGE INV% RPT% CEO DEVR △INAUD RET △CPA SIZE 
FRAUD 
 
1           
 
   
HIGHGR -0.117 
0.005 
1          
 
   
AFE 0.186 
0.000 
-0.036 
0.397 
1         
 
   
LOSS 0.199 
0.000 
-0.161 
0.000 
0.014 
0.733 
1        
 
   
NCFO 0.150 
0.000 
-0.060 
0.236 
0.057 
0.174 
0.045 
0.283 
1       
 
   
LEV 0.381 
0.000 
0.020 
0.641 
0.187 
0.000 
0.271 
0.000 
0.285 
0.000 
1      
 
   
PLEDGE 0.191 
0.000 
-0.060 
0.154 
0.002 
0.971 
0.055 
0.194 
0.113 
0.007 
0.177 
0.000 
1     
 
   
INV% 0.067 
0.110 
-0.027 
0.523 
0.050 
0.237 
0.098 
0.020 
-0.076 
0.072 
0.011 
0.795 
0.176 
0.000 
1    
 
   
RPT% 0.075 
0.076 
0.038 
0.366 
0.017 
0.685 
-0.036 
0.399 
-0.057 
0.174 
-0.020 
0.634 
-0.048 
0.255 
0.171 
0.000 
1   
 
   
CEO 0.041 
0.335 
0.033 
0.429 
0.083 
0.049 
0.059 
0.164 
0.036 
0.394 
0.026 
0.538 
-0.095 
0.024 
0.006 
0.888 
0.092 
0.028 
1  
 
   
DEVR 0.065 
0.125 
0.005 
0.901 
0.078 
0.063 
0.030 
0.476 
0.049 
0.246 
-0.011 
0.789 
0.173 
0.000 
-0.041 
0.326 
-0.143 
0.001 
0.130 
0.002 
1 
 
   
△INAUD 0.121 
0.004 
-0.040 
0.339 
-0.033 
0.440 
0.135 
0.001 
0.026 
0.545 
0.097 
0.021 
0.002 
0.965 
0.042 
0.318 
0.033 
0.437 
0.022 
0.601 
-0.034 
0.427 
1 
   
RST 0.218 
0.000 
0.011 
0.801 
0.073 
0.083 
0.116 
0.006 
0.087 
0.038 
0.149 
0.000 
-0.015 
0.727 
0.239 
0.000 
0.074 
0.077 
0.118 
0.005 
0.056 
0.183 
0.105 
0.013 
1   
△CPA 0.300 
0.000 
-0.112 
0.015 
0.120 
0.004 
0.138 
0.001 
0.021 
0.625 
0.152 
0.000 
0.096 
0.023 
-0.007 
0.860 
-0.013 
0.751 
0.102 
0.015 
0.039 
0.356 
0.139 
0.001 
0.056 
0.185 
1  
SIZE 0.013 
0.751 
0.130 
0.002 
0.004 
0.932 
0.051 
0.224 
0.009 
0.840 
0.164 
0.000 
0.265 
0.000 
0.265 
0.000 
0.090 
0.032 
-0.141 
0.001 
-0.099 
0.018 
-0.051 
0.228 
0.096 
0.023 
-0.044 
0.302 
1 
a. We report Spearman-rank correlation coefficients (first line) and p value (second line) for variables. 
b. Variables are defined in Table 2. 
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TABLE 4: Results of Models 
Fraud = β0 + β1 AFE + β2 LEV + β3 PLEDGE + β4 RPT% + β5 △INAUD +β6 RST + β7 △CPA + β8 SIZE + ε  
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coe.a Wald χ2 Coe.a Wald χ2 Coe.a Wald χ2 Coe.a Wald χ2 
Intercept  -0.4485 0.0166 -2.7320 0.9741 -0.5789 0.0352 1.3761 0.1278 
Pressure/Incentive        
AFE + 0.1677 9.9298***     0.1942 12.4439*** 
LEV + 5.4916 42.0024***     4.5770 24.0543*** 
PLEDGE + 1.4334 10.0702***     1.8127 13.2082*** 
Opportunity         
RPT% +   1.1245 5.2455**   1.5059 4.7253** 
△INAUD +   0.7032 6.2225**   0.4153 1.2744 
Attitude/Rationalization        
RST +     0.5446 20.8184*** 0.5243 16.0400*** 
△CPA +     2.5472 28.4351*** 2.1502 12.3446*** 
Control Variable        
SIZE - -0.4573 1.6279 0.0930 0.1090 -0.1458 0.2133 -0.6762 2.8646* 
LR index 142.0395 (p <.0001) 10.8014 (p <.05) 72.1030 (p <.0001) 186.3288 (p <.0001) 
Model R2 0.2226 0.019 0.1200 0.2813 
Concordant 80.8% 58.7% 66.2% 86.5% 
Discordant 18.8% 38.2% 29.7% 13.1% 
a. The coefficient of estimated of the model. 
*, **, *** Significant at p-value < .10, .05, .01, respectively. 
The variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
 
Assessments Of Model Performance 
 
We can confirm assessments of model performance with limited acknowledgement of fraud samples by the 
jackknife method, which appraises result replicability without reconducting the same study with new samples (Crask 
and Perreault, 1977; Tukey, 1958). The jackknife method is applied by removal of one observation and repeat of the 
rule by n times (n equals number of samples) to determine misclassified frequency. Thus, the jackknife method is 
called the “leave-one-out” method. This approach was demonstrated to produce more conservative and fewer biased 
estimates of true population chacteristics (Crask and Perreault, 1977).  
 
Table 5 presents classification accuracy of Model 4 using the Jackknife method by cut-off points from 0.00 
to 1.00 with 0.05 intervals. Under different cut-off point, 564 firms, divided into fraud and non-fraud firms by 
Model 4, reveal different classification accuracy. To maximize total percentage of classification accuracy for both 
groups, the cut-off point is approximate 0.15. At probabiliy level of 0.10, 80 fraud firms out of 97 fraud firms are 
correctly classified with accuracy of 82.5%, and 327 non-fraud firms out of 467 non-fraud firms are correctly 
classified with accuracy of 70%. 
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TABLE 5: Classification Table by Jackknife Method 
Probability level 
Fraud Non-fraud 
Correct % Correct % 
1.00 0 0.00 467 100.00 
0.99 12 12.40 467 100.00 
0.98 13 13.40 467 100.00 
0.97 15 15.50 466 99.80 
0.96 17 17.50 466 99.80 
0.95 17 17.50 466 99.80 
0.90 21 21.60 465 99.60 
0.85 24 24.70 465 99.60 
0.80 26 26.80 463 99.10 
0.75 31 32.00 462 98.90 
0.70 32 33.00 458 98.10 
0.65 39 40.20 457 97.90 
0.60 39 40.20 456 97.60 
0.55 41 42.30 454 97.20 
0.50 44 45.40 453 97.00 
0.45 46 47.40 452 96.80 
0.40 50 51.50 450 96.40 
0.35 53 54.60 445 95.30 
0.30 55 56.70 437 93.60 
0.25 59 60.80 425 91.00 
0.20 68 70.10 410 87.80 
0.15 74 76.30 385 82.40 
0.10 80 82.50 327 70.00 
0.09 80 82.50 313 67.00 
0.08 80 82.50 280 60.00 
0.07 83 85.60 252 54.00 
0.06 89 91.80 227 48.60 
0.05 90 92.80 186 39.80 
0.04 92 94.80 129 27.60 
0.03 94 96.90 79 16.90 
0.02 96 99.00 41 8.80 
0.01 97 100.00 5 1.10 
0.00 97 100.00 0 0.00 
 
 
TABLE 6: Risk Classification Table 
Hazard rate Fraud Non-fraud 
Low risk group (   <0.05) 6 (  6.2%) 125 ( 26.9%) 
Middle risk group (0.05-0.10) 13 ( 13.4%) 187 ( 40.0%) 
High risk group (0.10-0.20) 17 ( 17.5%) 95 ( 20.3%) 
Very high risk group (   >0.20) 61 ( 62.9%) 60 ( 12.8%) 
Total 97 (100.0%) 467 (100.0%) 
 
 
564 firms are divided into “low risk”, “middle risk”, “high risk”, and “very high risk” groups according to 
hazard rate in Table 6. Hazard rate greater than 0.20 of a firm belongs to the very high risk group, in which 62.9% of 
fraud firms are correctly classified. Hazard rate smaller than 0.05 of a firm belongs to the low risk group, in which 
26.9% non-fraud firms are correctly classified. If we combine the very high group with the high risk group, 
classification accuracy of fraud firms is 80.4%. By combination of the low risk group with the middle risk group, 
classification accuracy of non-fraud firms is 66.9%. Classification accuracy of the logistic model for non-fraud firms 
is lower than fraud firms, exhibiting higher type I error of the logistic model (Tam and Kiang, 1992). In current audit 
environment, fail to detect existing fraud seems to be more concerned than costly examination of a nonexistent fraud 
(Wilks and Zimbelman, 2004). Next, we evaluate the model by additional test. 
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TABLE 7: Results of Logistic Regression a 
LR index for Model 
p-value             
Model R2           
Concordant          
Discordant           
= 95.4184 
= <.0001 
= .29 
= 87.2% 
= 12.5% 
Variable b Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-square p-value 
Intercept -0.9339 5.1971 0.0323 0.8574 
AFE 0.2169 0.0842 6.6424 0.0100 
LEV 5.4384 1.3638 15.9029 <.0001 
PLEDGE 1.8493 0.7033 6.9143 0.0086 
RPT% 2.2665 1.0588 4.5821 0.0323 
△INAUD 0.6391 0.5319 1.4437 0.2295 
RST  0.4534 0.2278 3.9628 0.0465 
△CPA 2.2504 0.8333 7.2923 0.0069 
SIZE -0.4879 0.5406 0.8143 0.3669 
 
  Model  Predications c 
  Fraud Non-fraud 
Actual 
Fraud 31 18 
Non-fraud 197 216 
 
                    
a. Estimated on 49 frauds and 233 non-fraud samples. 
b. Variables are defined in Table 2. 
c. Based on prior probabilities and cut-off level is 0.2. Accuracy classification rate = (31 + 216) / 282 = 87.6%. 
 
Additional Test 
 
To test stability of the model, original samples are randomly divided into two groups, estimated samples 
(49 fraud samples and 233 non-fraud samples) and holdout samples (48 fraud samples and 234 non-fraud samples). 
Results of logistic regression of estimated examples are listed in Table 7. Likelihood ratio, class percent concordance, 
and R-square are, respectively, 95.4184 (p < .0001), 87.2%, and 0.29, similar to Model 4. Based on prior probability 
and cut-off level of 0.2, rate of accuracy classification is 87.6%. However, SIZE is insignificant. 
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To examine effect of size and diversity of samples on Model 4, we use the model (FRAUD = -0.9339 + 
0.2169AFE + 5.4384LEV + 1.8393PLEDGE + 2.2665RPT% + 0.6391△INAUD + 0.4534RST + 2.2504△CPA – 
0.4879SIZE) assayed by estimated samples to classify holdout samples according to hazard rate into “very high risk”, 
“high risk”, “middle risk”, and “low risk” groups. Figure 1 exhibits classification accuracy of holdout samples. This 
results imply that the percentage of fraud firms correctly classified into the very high risk and the high risk groups is 
85.4% (75%+10.4%) and that of non-fraud firms correctly classified into the low risk and the middle risk groups is 
62.4% (34.2%+28.2%). These results affirm fine classification ability of the present proposed model. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research examines risk factors of the fraud triangle, which becomes the core of all fraud auditing 
standards, to assess the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. 97 fraud and 467 non-fraud cases are used to 
develop and test a logistic regression model that estimates the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. 
Significant proxy variables include analyst’s forecast error (AFE), debt ratio (LEV), directors and supervisors’ stock 
pledged ratio (PLEDGE), percentage of sales related party transaction (RPT%), historical restate times (RST), and 
number of auditor switch (CPA), belonging pressure/incentive, opportunity, and attitude/rationalization. Results 
indicate that such fraudulent financial reporting is positively correlated to one of the following conditions: more 
financial pressure of a firm or a supervisor of a firm, higher ratio of complex transactions, more questionable 
integrity of firm managers, or more deterioration in relation between a firm and its auditor. Firm size negatively 
correlates with fraud, consistent with previous papers (Bonner et al. 1998; Beasley et al. 1999). To assess model 
performance, we apply jackknife method in forecasting classification accuracy. Rate of correct classification in the 
present model is 86.5%, higher than models developed by Persons (1995), Kaminski et al. (2004), and Skousen and 
Wright (2006). Through addition test, the model in this paper presents good classification ability. As compared with 
prior researches, this paper is superior in contributions to this field in two ways. First, based on fraud triangle 
accepted by fraud standards (SAS 99, ISA 240, and TSAS 43), we develop a practical model. Second, instead of 
subjective measures and copious red flag questionnaires, we identify proxy variables related to pressure/incentive, 
opportunity, and attitude/rationalization. Results suggest that a simple logistic model constructed from examples of 
fraud-risk factors of ISA 240 and SAS 99 is able to assess the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting and can 
become a useful tool for practitioners. 
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